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ARE EMPLOYEES OBTAINING "SURE AND CERTAIN RELIEF"
UNDER THE 1995 LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS OF THE NORTH
DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT?
SUSAN J. ANDERSON* & GERALD (JUD) DELoss**
I. INTRODUCTION
The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act was created as a
compact between workers and employers. The concept behind workers'
compensation is that workers forego suing their employers when injured
on the job, in exchange for an employer's agreement to cover those
injuries, through payment of premiums to the Workers' Compensation
Bureau. The system is to provide immunity to employers, and provide
employees, their families and dependents, sure and certain relief regard-
less of questions of fault.
"Sure and certain relief" remains an amorphous concept. It
transfigures itself with the social and economic climate of the times, with
the changing expectations of those who should receive it and those who
should give it.l "Sure and certain relief' was initially created to provide
benefits for wage loss and medical bills. Yet, as the world became more
technical, more long term disabilities began to develop in the workplace.
As a result, the Workers' Compensation Act had to expand in order to
provide relief for these disabilities. Within the last ten years, enactments
in the Workers' Compensation Act have expanded "sure and certain
relief' to include not only wage loss and medical benefits, but benefits
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1. The amorphous nature of "sure and certain relief" is captured by viewing the different
expectations between claimants and Workers' Compensation Bureau [hereinafter Bureau] members.
The Bureau's expectation of "sure and certain relief' is promptly returning employees to work so that
they may become self sufficient and no longer needing benefits. This view is reasonable considering
that the Bureau is not a general health insurer, but rather a statutorily created entity to provide relief
only to workers injured in the course of their employment. Employees' expectations of "sure and
certain relief" encompass financial, emotional, and physical protection. Claimants want the financial
protection to provide for themselves and their families while disabled and until returned to the
workforce. Furthermore, they seek the emotional and physical protection of knowing they are
physically able to return to work without fear of aggravating an injury or suffering a new one.
Employees and the Bureau agree that morale is boosted when claimants are out of the workers'
compensation web and returned as functioning members of the workforce and society. But.
differences lie in how and when workers should be returned to the workforce.
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such as permanent partial impairment awards and rehabilitative services.
Although the North Dakota Legislature realized that expansions were
necessary to provide "sure and certain relief' to injured employees,
they failed to realize the escalating costs that were associated with these
benefits. As a result of this expansion, the Legislature has become
saddled with the dilemma of providing "sure and certain relief' to
present and future injured employees while keeping insurance premiums
at a reasonable rate for employers in order that they may afford to keep
their workers employed.
In response to this dilemma, in 1995, the North Dakota Legislature
modified the expanded concept of "sure and certain relief' by passing
enactments that limited benefits to injured workers who suffered
work-related medical injuries with objective signs, that encouraged the
return of the worker to the workforce as soon as possible, and that cut
back on costly litigation involved in workers' compensation claims. In
passing these enactments, the 1995 Legislature significantly altered the
Workers' Compensation Act, and as a result has adversely affected an
injured employee obtaining "sure and certain relief'. In protest to the
1995 enactments, opponents of the legislation drafted proposed legisla-
tive reforms called the Initiative Petition.2 The Initiative Petition repeals
the majority of the 1995 legislative enactments, retaining only some of
the 1995 enactments with slight modifications. The Petition goes on the
primary ballot in June of 1996. If passed into law, and not vetoed by
two-thirds of both the House and the Senate, it will become the new
Workers' Compensation Act.
This article will explore the major changes made by the 1995
legislature and the ramifications that those changes have had on an
injured employee's obtaining "sure and certain relief." Thereafter, the
Petition will be discussed in response to the 1995 changes, accompanied
with commentary addressing whether its suggestions are beneficial to the
injured employee's quest for "sure and certain relief."
II. HISTORY OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted in North Dakota to
resolve the perceived inadequacies of the civil justice system. The
purpose of the Act was to provide "sure and certain relief' for workers
injured in hazardous employment, regardless of fault.3 Before it was
2. INrmlATVE PETITION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA (1996) [hereinafter
INITIATIVE PETITION]. The Initiative Petition is the brain child of the non-profit group Workers Against
Inhumane Treatment [hereinafter W.A.I.T.].
3. Breitwieser v. State. 62 N.W.2d 900, 902 (N.D. 1954): State v. E.W. Wylie Co.. 58 N.W.2d 76.
81 (N.D. 1953); State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan. 175 N.W. 372. 377 (N.D. 1919).
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enacted, workplace safety had not been a primary concern, and compen-
sation to injured employees was generally random and ineffective:
The law [of industrial accidents] was wildly nonuniform, full of
unpardonable differences and distinctions. This meant that, by
1900, the [fellow-servant rule] had lost some of its reason for
being. It was no longer an efficient device for disposing of
accident claims. It did not have the courage of its cruelty, nor
the strength to be humane. It satisfied neither capital nor
labor. It siphoned millions of dollars into the hands of lawyers,
court systems, administrators, insurers, claims adjusters.
Companies spent and spent, yet did not buy industrial harmo-
ny-and not enough of the dollars flowed to the injured.
workmen. At the turn of the [twentieth] century, rumblings
were already heard of the movement that led to a workmen's
compensation plan.4
Consequently, Workers' Compensation developed, where, both the
employer and the employee exchanged certain common law rights for
the benefits of a regulated system. 5 The employee gave up his or her
right to seek damages by instituting an action against the employer. 6
Conversely, the employer was relieved of civil liability for damages by its
contribution to the workers' compensation fund and was presented with
a quantifiable risk.7
4. Haney v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 213 (N.D. 1994)
(Meschke, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). See also Hagan, 175 N.W. at 383 (Robinson, J.,
dissenting) (stating that
"[tihe purpose of such an act is to make a business that is hazardous and dangerous bear
the inherent risks of personal injury arising in the course of the employment, regardless
of ordinary negligence also to do away with long-continued and vexatious litigation and
the exorbitant claims of personal injury lawyers, who commonly take half the sum
recovered, as if they had sustained half the injury. Then, as it were, they move heaven
and earth to procure a verdict and to sustain it, and often stand in the way of a settlement
of great benefit to the injured party.").
5. Breitwieser, 62 N.W.2d at 902; Wylie, 58 N.W.2d at 81.
6. See 1919 N.D. Laws ch. 162. Thus, all remedies, proceedings, compensation, civil actions, or
causes of action were abolished. See also Wylie, 58 N.W.2d at 81. This was a small concession for
the employee, at the time of the enactment. Historically, in order to succeed on a claim of negligence,
the employee had to overcome the common-law defenses of contributory negligence, the
fellow-servant rule, and assumption of the risk. George H. Singer, Workers' Compensation: The
Assault on the Shield of Immunity-Coming to Blows with the Exclusive-Remedy Provisions of the North
Dakota Workers' Compensation Act, 70 N.D. L. REv. 905, 908-09 (1994). See also 1919 N.D. Laws
ch. 162, § 11. Under the 1995 amendments, an employee may sue his or her employer if the employer
has failed to comply with the Act and the employee is injured, and the employer may not assert the
common-law defenses of the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 65-09-02 (1995). The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were
previously abolished by their incorporation into North Dakota's comparative fault statute. Haney, 518
N.W.2d at 200.
7. Wylie, 58 N.W.2d at 81.
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Thus was provided a more certain, speedy and inexpensive
relief for the injured workman than was afforded by the
common-law rule of negligence. Industry was made to bear a
portion of the economic loss resulting from the employment
itself in which both employer and employee were engaged as
co-adventurers. The ultimate end is to lighten the burden
imposed upon society by reason of industrial accident and
disease. 8
Simultaneous to its enactment, the North Dakota Legislature was
heavily involved in other forms of social engineering. The same Legis-
lative Assembly that created the Workers' Compensation Act also
adopted legislation creating a state bank, a state mill, and a state eleva-
tor.9 Not surprisingly, the original bill exhibited a socialist bent. The
fund was entitled the "North Dakota Insurance Fund."10 The bill was
subsequently amended to replace "Insurance" with "Workmen's
Compensation.""I The stated intent of the Act was to "restore to
industry those injured in the course of employment."1 2 This was to be
accomplished by providing the appropriate training, education, and
employment. 13
Since its initial adoption, the Workers' Compensation Act has
withstood several constitutional attacks. For example, the Act has been
upheld against a claim that it arbitrarily and unreasonably included
certain occupations which were not hazardous and excluded others that
8. Id. See also Singer, supra note 6, at 912 (stating that industry requiring human agency for its
operation should be responsible for the upkeep of that agency).
9. State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 175 N.W. 372, 377 (N.D. 1919). According to the Hagan
Court. some of that legislation was referred to the people by referendum petitions, however, the
Workers' Compensation Act was not one of the referred enactments. Id. The populist nature of the
Act and its counterparts prompted one North Dakota Supreme Court Justice to comment: "[The
Workers' Compensation Act] was passed by a farmer Legislature, which did not care to impose on
themselves the burdens of compulsory insurance for their employees [sic]. It is an act for the cities.
and not for the country. The farmer Legislature had no interest in the rates." Id. at 385 (Robinson, J.,
dissenting).
10. See H.J. 16th Leg. Assembly, 1st Sess. 295-99 (1919) (indicating that the word "insurance"
should be struck from the title).
11. Id. The supreme court's treatment of the fund has been similarly dysfunctional. The court
began by analogizing workers' compensation to a contract of insurance for purposes of construing the
Act. Bordson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 191 N.W. 839, 841-42 (N.D. 1922). In
Sandlie v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 295 N.W. 497 (N.D. 1940), the court held that the
fund is not a health or life insurance fund, nor was it an accident insurance fund, except to a limited
degree. Id. at 499. In Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1954), the Court concluded that the
fund became the "insurer of the employe[e] for injuries or death occurring in his employment." Id. at
902. Subsequently in Beyer's Cement, Inc. v. North Dakota Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 417 N.W.2d 370, 373
(N.D. 1987), the court held that workers' compensation was like accident insurance in that it was
made available when an injury occurs, but is unlike accident insurance because it was governmentally
created and run, the injury must be work-related, and fault is irrelevant.




were. 14 Later decisions by the court have upheld this distinction, specifi-
cally the agricultural exemption from the Act's compulsory enroll-
ment. 15 Nonetheless, the court, has not hesitated to act when it perceives
an unconstitutional action by the Bureau in promulgating or enforcing
its regulations.16
The judiciary's police powers continue to exist and thus the legisla-
ture has a duty to act reasonably.1 7 It remains to be seen whether the
1995 enactments and amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act
satisfy this requirement.
III. THE 1995 LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
A. REHABILITATIVE SERVICES
In 1975, the North Dakota Legislature incorporated rehabilitative
services into the Workers' Compensation Act.18 Rehabilitation encom-
passes the notion that compensation is not complete when the wound has
been healed, but rather completeness requires that an injured worker be
restored to his maximum usefulness attainable with the physical impair-
ment. 19 Rehabilitative services include vocational retraining, counseling,
education, and workplace modification. 20 Eligibility for rehabilitative
services is considered on a case-by-case basis. An injured employee is
most likely to be eligible for rehabilitative services if he or she is unable
to return to his or her pre-injury occupation. In 1995, the North Dakota
Legislature enacted various amendments to the rehabilitative services
available to an employee.
14. State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 175 N.W. 372, 377-78 (N.D. 1919).
15. Benson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 107 (N.D. 1979),
overruled, Haney v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 202 (N.D. 1994). See
generally LeAnne K. Jabs, Comment, Constitutional Law-Workers' Compensation: Equal Protection
Challenge to the Agricultural Exemption and Use of Rational Basis Scrutiny in Haney v. North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Bureau, 518 N.W2d 195 (N.D. 1994), 71 N.D. L. R EV. 781 (1995) (discussing
the constitutional challenge to the agricultural exemption and identifying other states which use similar
exceptions).
16. See, e.g., Becker v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 418 N.W.2d 770, 775 (N.D.
1988) (holding the Bureau's pretermination procedure denied claimant due process under state and
federal constitutions).
17. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 201.
18. 1975 N.D. Laws ch. 584, sec. 1.
19. 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 61.21 (Supp. 1995).
20. N.D. CENT CODE § 65-01-02(27) (1995). Rehabilitation services are defined as "nonmedical
services reasonably necessary to restore a disabled employee to substantial gainful employment as
defined by section 65-05.1-01 as nearly as possible." Id. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text (defining "substantial gainful employment").
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1. Income Test
One area of rehabilitative services that under went renovation by the
1995 Legislature was vocational rehabilitation. Vocational retraining is
utilized only when an employee is unable to be pigeon-holed into one of
the categories listed in the hierarchical priority options of section
65-05.1-01(4).21 The goal of vocational rehabilitation is to return the
injured employee to "substantial gainful employment," with as little
retraining as possible.22 "Substantial gainful employment" is bona fide
work which is reasonably attainable in light of various factors, 23 and
which provides an opportunity to restore the employee as soon as
possible and as nearly as possible to 90% of the employee's average
weekly wage or to 66 2/3% of the states' average weekly wage, whichever
is less.24 This percentage basis is known as the income test.25
Prior to 1995, "substantial gainful employment" attempted to
restore an injured employee to the employee's average weekly wage at
the time of injury or to 75% percent of North Dakota's average weekly
wage. 26 The 1995 legislature cut the income test from 100% of the
employee's average weekly wage to 90% and, alternatively, from 75% of
North Dakota's average weekly wage to 66 2/3%.27 The former reduc-
tion was made to provide consistency in the payment of benefits .28 The
latter reduction from 75% to 66 2/3% was made to allow the Bureau
greater flexibility in identifying rehabilitation options for injured
employees .29
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4) (1995). See infra part III.A.2 and accompanying text
(identifying the hierarchical priority options).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (1995).
23. Id. Such factors include: an injured worker's injury, functional capacities, education,
previous occupation, experience, and transferable skills. Id. See also infra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text (discussing an injured employee's functional capacities).
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (1995).
25. Id. This income test is employed to fit an employee into one of the listed options found in §
65-05.1-01(4). Id.
26. 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 714, sec. 55. The legislature has consistently cut back on the definition
of "substantial gainful employment." Prior to 1991, the state attempted to restore the employee to his
average weekly earnings at the time of injury or to the average weekly wage in North Dakota.
whichever was less. 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 771, sec. 1.
27. 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 628, sec. 2.
28. See Testimony to the House Indus., Business. & Labor Comm. on H.B. No. 1253 (Jan. 23.
1994) (written testimony of Julie Leer, attorney for Bureau). This reduction in the income test from
100% to 90% of the employee's average weekly wage provides consistency with § 65-05-10. Id.
Section 65-50-10 precludes payment of temporary partial disability benefits unless the loss of earning
capacity exceeds 10%. Id.
29. Id. Testimony relied upon expected this provision in the income test to allow vocational
consultants to identify more return-to-work options or short-term retraining options for employees. Id.
354 [VOL. 72:349
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The average weekly wage in North Dakota is $373.30 Sixty-six and
two-thirds of that wage results in an average weekly wage of $248.64, or
$6.22 per/hr. Prior to 1995, the average weekly wage used by the
Bureau was $279.75, or $7 per/hr. 31 This $31.11 reduction has resulted
in an expanded employment base for vocational consultants to find work
for an injured employee. The pre-1995 income test wage results in 64
various jobs offering a starting wage near $7 per/hr.32 The 1995 enact-
ment's income test wage results in 84 jobs offering a starting wage near
$6.22 per/hr. 33 Consequently, the 1995 reduction in the income test has
increased the employment base for which the Bureau may return a
worker to the workforce and reduced the amount of time an injured
worker is required to be out of the work force.
According to the Workers' Compensation Bureau, the enactments
provide "sure and certain relief' to an employee because they are being
returned to the workforce more quickly than in the years previous. But
from an employee's perspective, the employees are being denied "sure
and certain relief' because the injured worker is being returned to a job
which is grossly underpaid compared to the injured employee's
pre-injury standard of living. The Bureau contends that they are not a
job service and their responsibility is to return the worker to the
workforce. But the figures are deceiving. The above figures are based
upon a forty hour work week. Many of the jobs included in the expand-
ed job listing do not provide employment for forty hours a week. Thus,
the expansion of the employment base may not be as large as considered
by the above figures. Furthermore, the employment figures only
represent the availability of jobs, not whether injured employees are
suited for that employment, or whether those jobs are available. Al-
though the reduction in the income test has allegedly created nineteen
more occupations to which a worker may be returned, the increase is
moot if the jobs are not available, or the injured employee is not suited
for that occupation.
Furthermore, any financial protection that an injured employee may
receive with the Bureau's utilization of the income test is impotent. The
Bureau need only return the worker to a job which "offers an opportu-
nity to restore the employee as soon as practical and as nearly as
30. TOM PEDERSON & A. NELSE GRUDVIG, JOB SERVICE NORTH DAKOTA, 1996 ANNUAL PLANNING
REPORT 18 (1996). The $373 figure represents the average North Dakota weekly wage in 1994.
31. See supra text accompanying note 26 ($373 x 75% = $279.75).
32. See TOM PEDERSON & LYNDA S TEINWAND, JOB SERVICE NORTH DAKOTA, WAGE & BENEFIT
SURVEY, 1994-1995 12-35 (1996). Calculations were made with a $.30 differential to accommodate
the "nearly as possible" language of § 65-05.1-01(3). See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
33. See PEDERSON & STEINWAND, supra note 32, at 12-35.
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possible to the employee's average weekly earnings." 34 In loosely
construing section 65-05.1-01(3), the North Dakota Supreme Court has
taken the bite out of the income test intended to provide protection to
the employee. The employee is not guaranteed a wage of, for example,
$6.22 per/hr, but only a wage "as nearly as possible" to the $6.22
per/hr. With a lower weekly wage and controlling precedent that does
not require a worker to be given that weekly wage, injured workers feel
that they are unable to care for their families if put through the rehabili-
tation process. Routinely, the rehabilitation process causes economic
strain on families. Many families are reduced to a standard of living well
below their pre-injury living. In failing to provide financial protection,
the rehabilitative process reduces an employee's financial incentive to
become rehabilitated and stunts obtaining "sure and certain relief'. 35
Subsection seven of section 65-05.1-01 waives the income test if the
injured employee is offered a return to work option at a wage lower than
that provided by the income test. 36 If an injured employee is offered
employment by his pre-injury employer, the employee's right to the
income test is waived. 37 The rationale behind this enactment is based on
the notion that returning a worker to his pre-injury employer increases
his chances of obtaining his pre-injury employment or of obtaining a
job with a similar wage to that of his pre-injury wage since the pre-injury
employer would be more sympathetic toward the injured employee.
But by enacting subsection seven, the Legislature has eradicated any
financial protection given to an employee. No longer is he entitled to
$6.22 per/hr or a wage "as nearly as" possible to $6.22. Rather, the
employer may pay the injured employee as little as he wants, within state
minimum wage laws. Obviously, opponents to the legislation are con-
cerned with the economic impact that this legislation will have on injured
employees who are offered return-to-work programs by their pre-injury
employer. The Bureau has attempted to provide some remedial relief.
The Bureau will pay two-thirds of the difference between pre-injury
wages and post-earning capacity if an injured employee is returned to
34. Held v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 540 N.W.2d 166, 170 (N.D. 1995)
(concluding that a rehabilitation plan does not predetermine a weekly wage). See supra notes 23-24
(discussing "substantial gainful employment").
35. See 2 LARSON, supra note 19, § 61.24 (discussing "sure and certain relief").
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(7) (1995).
37. Id. This section requires the waiver of the income test when an employer offers the
employee a return-to-work option at a wage lower than the income test. Id. Although the statute
mandates waiver if offered by an "employer," the Bureau has assured that it only applies to an
employee's pre-injury employer. Telephone Interview with Julie Leer, Workers' Compensation
Bureau (April 9, 1996).
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his pre-injury employer and the employee does not make 90% of his
earning capacity. 38
Understandably, the Initiative Petition repeals the 1995 enactments
to the rehabilitative statute and returns the income test to 100% of the
worker's average weekly wage at the time the injury occurred or to 90%
of North Dakota's average weekly wage, whichever is less. 39 It also
repeals the mandatory waiver of the income test in subsection seven.40
The Petition makes the waiver of the income test voluntary between the
Bureau and the injured employee. 4 1 This will at least give the injured
employee some involvement in their rehabilitative process which may
make the worker more responsive to the rehabilitation process.
However, although the amendments to the income test could drasti-
cally impact an employee's earnings, the Initiated Petition does not
necessarily provide the best solution to the problem. Raising the income
test to 100% of the workers' average weekly wage or 90% of North
Dakota's average weekly wage, establishes an average weekly wage of at
least $335.70 or $8.38 per/hr.42 There are 22 occupations that fall within
the wage per hour at 90% of North Dakota's average weekly wage. 43
Although the increase in the income test would provide the financial
protection needed to employees, it would severely limit the employment
base in which to return workers. Therefore, the drafters should reconsid-
er such a large increase in the income test. Perhaps the best route would
be to find a wage that will provide the greatest number of jobs and
provide a wage that would result in a higher income level for the injured
employee. Another consideration would be to draft the income test as a
per hour wage as opposed to a weekly wage. This would accommodate
jobs that do not provide forty hour work weeks and still provide some
financial protection to the injured employee.
2. Priority Options
The priority options listed in section 65-05.1-01(4) were also
modified in 1995 so that the return-to-work options provide a more
flexible placement for the injured worker in the work force. 44 In return-
ing an injured worker to the workforce, vocational consultants attempt to
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(3) (1995).
39. INITIATIVE PETITION, supra note 2, § 21.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (providing the average weekly wage of $373, thus
calculating $373 x 90% = $335.70; further, 335.70 x 40 hrs. = $8.38 per/hr).
43. See PEDERSON & STEINWAND. supra note 32, 12-35.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4) (1995).
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return the worker using the priority options. 45 The priority options
provide a preferential hierarchy to return the injured employee to
work. 46 For example, prior to 1995, the listed options, in order of
preference, were to return the employee to the same position; return the
employee to a modified position; return the employee to an occupation
in the local job pool; or return the employee to an occupation in the
statewide job pool.47 The options were changed in 1995 so that, in order
of preference the options are: to return the employee to the same
position, same employer; to the same occupation, any employer; to a
modified position, a modified or alternative occupation, any employer. 48
The 1995 enactments also allow the Bureau greater ease to return the
worker to employment anywhere in the state. Under the 1995 enact-
ments, first an attempt must be made to place the injured employee in
the same occupation with the same employer.4 9 If that fails, for example,
because the employer has filled the injured employee's position, then an
attempt must be made to place the worker in the same position with any
employer anywhere in the state.50 Prior to 1995, the first attempt was to
place that same injured employee into the same position with the same
employer; but, if that failed, then the employee was placed into a modi-
fied position with his pre-injury employer.51
Opponents of the enactment are concerned that they will have to
move across the state in order to find work with no real financial protec-
tion because of the lax requirement of the income test. This results in a
tremendous economic strain on the employee and his family.
The Initiative Petition repeals the 1995 enactments and requires the
Bureau to attempt to place the injured employee to a modified position
with his pre-injury employer before attempting to place him somewhere
else in the state.52 Although this enactment may hinder the Bureau's job
placement, it will at least provide an injured employee a chance to
remain in the area. Furthermore, the employee would not have to bear
the expenses of moving himself and his family around the state.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 628, § 2.
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4) (1995).
49. Id.
50. 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 628, § 2.
51. Id.




If none of the options of section 65-05.1-01(4) are feasible and the
employee is released by his doctor to work part-time with the "reason-
able expectation" of attaining full-time employment, the Bureau will
pay temporary partial disability benefits until the employee is medically
capable of full-time employment. 53 Prior to 1995, the worker remained
on disability benefits until he was able to return to full time work. This
resulted in the Bureau paying benefits to workers who were able to work
part time but were unable to work full-time due to medical reasons.
Furthermore, it failed to return the worker to any kind of employment.
The Legislature enacted section 65-05.1-01(5) to return an injured
employee to the workforce, even though he may not be able to work
full-time at the time he begins part-time employment. 54 The enactment
requires that the employment be one in which there is a "reasonable
expectation" of full-time employment. 55
But in passing this legislation, the Legislature created a loop-hole by
putting workers back to work and getting workers off benefits with a low
part-time wage. The Legislature failed to define "reasonable expecta-
tion." Without a guiding interpretation of "reasonable expectation,"
the Legislature has created a litigious issue as well as providing little
protection to the employee. Opponents fear that this enactment allows
the bureau to cut off an injured employee's rehabilitation benefits with
no real guarantee that the employee will return to full time work.
The Initiative Petition repeals the above section. 56 However, in
doing so, it could adversely affect an employee's "sure and certain
relief." Both supporters and opponents of the 1995 enactments ac-
knowledge that getting the employee back to work is beneficial to both
the employer and the employee. What is needed is more financial
protection to the employee. Repealing this section eliminates a chance
of a worker being returned to the workforce. The 1995 enactment
provides a great opportunity for an injured employee to return to work,
with some financial protection through temporary partial benefits. The
concern lies in the interpretation of "reasonable expectation." If the
drafters of the Initiative Petition could have provided a definition of
"reasonable expectation" which gives some assurance to the injured
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(5) (1995).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. INmATIVE PETmo, supra note 39, § 21.
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employee that his position will become full-time, then his "sure and
certain relief' will be greatly enhanced.
4. Definition of Substantial Gainful Employment
In 1995, the Legislature redefined "substantial gainful employ-
ment." 57 In redefining this phrase, the Legislature eliminated an em-
ployee's medical limitations and age factors in consideration of whether
an injured employee should be returned to the workforce or retrained.
Instead, the 1995 enactments require the Bureau to consider an employ-
ee's "functional capacities" in the quest for substantial gainful employ-
ment. 58 The medical limitations factor was changed to functional
capacities thus shifting the focus from an injured employee's physical
limitations to his positive attributes. 59 The age factor was taken out
because it allegedly violated state and federal law on hiring discrimina-
tion. 60 In reworking this definition, the Legislature failed to define
"functional capacities." But the legislative history defines "functional
capacities" as an "objective measurement of an individual's physical
capacity to perform work and defines both physical ability and work
tolerance levels."6 1 Thus, even though the term "medical limitation"
was removed, an employee's medical condition is still considered under
the "functional capacities" definition.
The Initiative Petition repeals the 1995 enactments and requires that
vocational consultants consider an employee's medical limitations and
age in considering returning an employee to gainful employment. 62
The 1995 enactments were made to conform the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act to constitutional requirements. The Initiative Petition's require-
ment that age be a consideration in rehabilitating an injured employee
will most likely fail due to due process and equal protection concerns.
Furthermore, the terminology change was made to benefit an employee,
and it accomplishes just that. The focus is now on an employee's
positive attributes as opposed to his limitations. Repealing the 1995
enactments to conform to pre-1995 requirements will only create delay
if age is considered under the statute because of the constitutional
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (1995).
58. Id.
59. See Testimony to the House Indus.. Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. No. 1253 (Jan. 23,
1994) (written testimony of Julie Leer, attorney for the Bureau).
60. Id. See N.D. CENT CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1995) (prohibiting discriminatory employment
practices on the basis of age). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) (containing the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
61. See Testimony to the House Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. No. 1253 (Jan. 23.
1994) (written testimony of Julie Leer, attorney for the Bureau).
62. INITIATIVE PETMON, supra note 2, § 21.
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challenges it will raise. Furthermore, age as a consideration may not
withstand constitutional scrutiny.63 Additionally, considering an injured
employee's medical limitations will focus on the injured employees
negative conditions. The Legislature altered -the language only as a
stylistic change and rescinding that alteration will only result in a stylistic
change that will have no bearing on employees obtaining "sure and
certain relief."
B. RETIREMENT CUT-OFF
Another new section to the Workers' Compensation Act discontin-
ues benefits to "retired" persons. 64 Under this statute, most workers
compensation benefits are to terminate upon "retirement."
65
The Bureau testified in support of the bill by stating it was inconsis-
tent to pay disability benefits to a retired worker who is no longer
employed. 66 Other supporters of the bill opined that workers' compen-
63. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3 (1995).
65. Id. This section provides:
1. An employee who has retired or voluntarily withdrawn from the labor force and who
is not eligible to receive temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, or
permanent total disability benefits, or a rehabilitation allowance from the bureau is
presumed retired from the labor market. The presumption may be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence, however, the subjective statement of an employee that
the employee is not retired is not sufficient in itself to rebut objective evidence of
retirement.
2. An injured employee who is receiving permanent total, temporary total, or temporary
partial disability benefits, or rehabilitation benefits, and who begins receiving social
security retirement benefits or other retirement benefits in lieu of social security
retirement benefits, or who is at least sixty-five years old and is eligible to receive social
security retirement benefits or other retirement benefits in lieu of social security benefits.
is considered to be retired. The bureau may not pay any permanent total, temporary
total, or temporary partial disability benefits, rehabilitation benefits, or supplemental
benefits to an employee who is considered retired: however, the bureau is liable for
payment of medical benefits and permanent partial impairment benefits. An employee
who is determined to be catastrophically injured as defined by subdivision c of subsection
2 of section 65-05.1-06.1 is not subject to this section.
3. The bureau retains liability for disability benefits, permanent partial impairment
benefits, and medical benefits for an injured employee who is eligible to receive social
security retirement benefits or other retirement benefits in lieu of social security, who is
gainfully employed, and who suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of that
employment.
4. This section applies to all persons who retire or become eligible for social security
retirement benefits or other retirement benefits in lieu of social security retirement
benefits after July 31, 1995.
Id.
66. Testimony to the House Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1228 (Jan. 24, 1995)
(written statement of Julie Leer, attorney for the Bureau). The Bureau argued that "[wiorkers'
compensation disability benefits are paid to compensate an injured employee for wages lost as a result
of a work-related injury. Retirement benefits are paid after a person has reached retirement age and
is no longer employed because the person has reached that age. The concept of paying a person who
is retired for being unable to work is contradictory." Id. (emphasis added).
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sation is not a retirement system, but rather a "'wage replacement'
system that provides tax-free benefits to injured workers until they reach
maximum medical improvement and return to work." 67 Opponents of
the bill, however, claimed that social security retirement benefits for
those injured early in life would be minuscule because these disabled
workers would be less able to contribute to the social security fund so as
to support themselves upon retirement.68
Opponents of the statute have strong ammunition for their position.
First, the statute contains internal inconsistencies. Subsection three of the
North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-09.3, states that the Bureau
remains liable for benefits owed to injured workers who are eligible to
receive social security or comparable retirement benefits, if the worker
suffers an injury while gainfully employed. 69 The subsection does not
explain why the arbitrary distinction is made between workers receiving
what the Bureau deems "wage replacement benefits" under the Act, and
those workers receiving actual wages from an employer, nor does it
explain when workers' compensation benefits for an eligible worker
would be terminated (presumably upon the actual receipt of social
security benefits). Apparently the Bureau will compensate workers that
it deems "retired," if that person should happen to be injured after he
or she becomes eligible for retirement benefits. If the worker should
become disabled before eligibility for retirement benefits is established,
then she or he is ineligible to receive workers' compensation upon
retirement, even if the work-related injury is the reason for not being
"gainfully employed" so as to receive benefits under subsection 3.
Second, the purpose underlying workers' compensation benefits is
not, as the Bureau has suggested, solely to replace lost wages. The
purpose of workers' compensation is to provide injured workers with
"sure and certain relief", regardless of questions of fault.70 As a result,
all remedies, proceedings, and actions were abolished. 7 1 The Act, by its
very terms, is not limited solely to lost earnings. 72 Compensation is
provided for other potential causes of action and injuries. 73
The constitutionality of the amendment may also be called into
question. By denying benefits to persons based on their age, the statute
67. Testimony to the House Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1228 (Jan. 24, 1995)
(written statement of Rep. Bob Skarphol).
68. Testimony to the House Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1228 (Jan. 24, 1995)
(statement of Elaine Speaks).
69. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3(3) (1995).
70. Id. § 65-01-01.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. § 65-01-02.
73. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9)(b)(9) (recognizing intentional infliction of
emotional distress as a compensable injury).
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may violate equal protection. 74 Normally there are three different
standards which are applied to review an equal protection claim depend-
ing on the right at stake: suspect class or fundamental rights are strictly
scrutinized; important substantive rights are reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny; and the remaining classes are reviewed under the rational basis
standard.7 5 The North Dakota Supreme Court, most recently in Haney v.
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau,76 applied the rational
basis standard to test the constitutionality of the agricultural exclusion
from workers' compensation coverage. 77 Other courts, in reviewing the
constitutionality of statutes similar to section 65-05-09.3, have also
applied the rational basis standard of review.8 Thus, for purposes of this
article, the rational basis standard of review will be used.
Under rational basis review, "a legislative classification will be
sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest." 79 A classification will not be held
to violate equal protection "if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it."80 Here, just as in Haney, the inquiry
must start with the specifically stated legislative objective. The rationale
set forth by proponents of House Bill No. 1228, was that the bill would
prevent duplication in benefits by retired persons who receive both social
security retirement benefits and workers' compensation benefits.8r If
this is the case, then the statute is not rationally related to its purpose,
because social security retirement benefits and workers' compensation
disability benefits do not serve the same purpose:
Social security retirement benefits are provided to persons over
age sixty-five regardless of injury, as long as the recipient has
reached the statutory age after having been employed and
having contributed to the Social Security Trust Fund. These
benefits are not disability benefits, but are old-age entitlements
serving the same function as pension payments. In contrast,
workers' compensation benefits are provided to compensate
74. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
75. Haney v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 197 (N.D. 1994).
76. 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994).
77. Haney v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 200 (N.D. 1994). The
court concluded that "[b]ecause the legislature created the remedy of workers' compensation
benefits, it [could] impose reasonable limits on it." Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
78. See, e.g., Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero. 912 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo. 1996) (stating
"[c]lassifications based on age are not suspect or special warranting strict scrutiny or intermediate
review" (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307. 313-14 (1976))).
79. Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 201 (quoting Lee v. Job Service North Dakota, 440 N.W.2d 518. 519
(N.D. 1989) (further citations omitted)).
80. Id.
81. Testimony to the House Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1228 (Jan. 24, 1995)
(written statement of Rep. Bob Skarphol).
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employees who suffer work-related injuries for loss of income
resulting from such injuries....
Thus, withholding workers' compensation benefits from
persons age sixty-five and older because they presumably
receive retirement benefits is not rationally related to the goal
of preventing duplicate benefits because workers' compensa-
tion benefits do not serve the same purpose as retirement
benefits .82
Furthermore, the statute is questionable because many persons age
sixty-five and older receive little or no social security. 83
Other possible reasons justifying the enactment of similar laws have
been discussed in jurisdictions other than North Dakota. For example, it
has been argued that the presumption that persons are retired and
receiving retirement benefits over the age of 65 is a reasonable distinc-
tion for the sake of administrative convenience. 84 Such an argument was
summarily dismissed by the Colorado Supreme Court.85
Another proffered reason for the statute has been that the reduction
in workers' compensation benefits corresponds with the declining
physical capacity of the elderly.86 Under this theory, the workers'
compensation benefits are reduced in order to match the lowered
income-producing abilities of persons reaching retirement age. 87 The
courts addressing this issue have only identified a tenuous relationship
between old age and decreased productivity. 88 This relationship would
be even further attenuated under North Dakota law.89 The North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Act computes benefits based on either the
worker's average weekly wage or the average weekly wage set for the
82. Romero. 912 P.2d at 67-68 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted); see also Sasso v. Ram
Property Management, 452 So. 2d 932, 934 n.3 (Fla. 1984) (agreeing that statute similar to the one at
hand was not rationally related to preventing "double-dipping" because "social security retirement
benefits do not serve the same purpose as wage-loss benefits").
83. Id. at 68 n.5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So. 2d 204,219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), affid, 452
So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1984); Cruz v. Chevrolet Grey Iron Div. of Gen. Motors, 247 N.W.2d 764, 767-68
(Mich. 1976).
87. Cruz. 247 N.W.2d at 767-68. This theory has only been held applicable to reductions in
workers' compensation benefits, not terminations. See id. The North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Act already recognizes this distinction. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-09.1 to -09.2 (1995) (providing
for "offset" by percentage reduction in the case of social security and retirement benefits
respectively).
88. Sasso,431 So. 2d at 219.
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09 (1995).
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state.90 Thus, the correlation between the worker's physical capacity and
the benefits under workers' compensation would be one step further
removed. Those cases allowing a reduction in workers' compensation
benefits for social security have allowed a reduction from the injured
worker's actual income, not from an average wage that does not corre-
spond to the worker's abilities.
A third possible rationale in support of the statute is that older
persons should be excluded from workers' compensation because they
would likely have retired even if they had not been injured.9 1 This could
be a valid reason, but the statute does not further that goal. "Even
assuming that such a presumption is rational, it is then irrational to allow
persons age sixty-five and older who are [permanently partially] dis-
abled to collect workers' compensation because such persons are no less
likely to retire at age sixty-five than those who are [totally] disabled."
92
The North Dakota statute still provides permanent partial impairment
benefits for retired workers. 93
The Bureau may argue in support of the statute claiming it provides
additional funds to be freed up for compensating younger workers and
to reduce employer premiums. 94 The courts are split over whether this
objective may be pursued by denying benefits to one class of workers
while providing such benefits to other workers. 95
Finally, the statute is contrary to the very purpose that workers'
compensation was created. 96 Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an
employer, by virtue of contributing to the fund, is no longer liable for
damages in an action by its employee, and in exchange for fund bene-
fits, an employee may not seek damages against his or her employer.
97
Under section 65-05-09.3, however, an injured worker eligible for
retirement benefits is precluded from receiving any workers' compensa-
tion benefits. 98 Thus, the Act abolishes any civil action and the statute
90. Id.
91. Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 69 (Colo. 1996).
92. Id.
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09 (1995).
94. Romero, 912 P.2d at 69. See also Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So. 2d 204, 220
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 452 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1984) (stating that a possible objective for the
statute is an attempt to offer increased job opportunities to young workers by creating incentives for
older workers to retire).
95. Compare Romero, 912 P.2d at 69-70 (affirming that granting increases in benefits to younger
workers by denying older workers benefits was arbitrary, unfair, and irrational) with Sasso, 431 So. 2d
at 220 (holding that attempting to create additional job opportunities for younger workers and reduce
premiums is a legitimate concern).
96. Romero, 912 P.2d at 70 n.9.
97. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1995).
98. Id. § 65-05-09.3.
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prevents any recovery of the fund.99 The statute would likely be found
unconstitutional, therefore, because it deprives elderly workers of an
adequate statutory remedy to replace their common law rights which
were originally abolished by the Workers' Compensation Act.100
Because section 65-05-09.3 conflicts with an elderly worker's right
to recover workers' compensation benefits and because the Act pre-
cludes any judicial remedy, it is possible that the heightened standard of
review could apply to cases arising under the statute. 101 In any event, the
statute appears to deny elderly workers equal protection, whether re-
viewed under an intermediate standard or rational review. 102
C. PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT
Permanent partial impairment (PPI) awards and benefits were also
impacted by the 1995 legislative session. 103 An employee is entitled to a
PPI award when he receives a compensable injury which results in a
permanent loss of or loss of use of a member of his body.104 This is a
tax-free award, given in addition to wage loss, medical expenses, and
rehabilitative benefits. PPI awards are determined by identifying the
level of impairment, or loss of function of a particular body part, as a
result of a work injury.105 The 1995 enactments require that impairment
evaluations be made under the American Medical Association's (AMA)
"Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" in effect at the
time of injury.106 In the case of physical impairments from mental
disorders, impairments are to be rated under the "Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" in effect at the time of injury.107
99. See id. (stating that those who receive retirement benefits in North Dakota are not eligible for
workers' compensation benefits).
100. Romero, 912 P.2d at 70 n.9. Because the Act prevents an injured party from suing, and the
statute eliminates a reciprocal benefit, the case of Haney v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau,
518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994), is distinguishable. The majority in Haney, held that the right to sue.
which injured workers gave up in exchange for "sure and certain relief', is an important substantive
right. Id. at 200. The majority concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act preserved that
important substantive right for agricultural workers, therefore the exclusion was constitutional. Id.
However, § 65-05-09.3 does precisely the opposite for elderly workers because they lose both a cause
of action against their employer and their right to recover the workers' compensation benefits which
were to be substituted for the lost cause of action. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3 (1995).
101. See Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 199-200 (stating that a heightened standard of review should be
used when a statute conflicts with fundamental rights).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3 (1995).
103. 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 624, § 1. This section was referred and therefore its effect is
suspended, pending the outcome of the June 1996 statewide election. N.D. CONST. art. III, § 5. If
approved by the voters, it will go into effect 30 days after the date of the statewide election. N.D.
CoNsT. art. III, § 8.
104. N.D. CENT CODE § 65-05-12.2 (1995).
105. Id.




Under present law, impairment ratings are determined from the most
recent edition of the AMA's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment" unless proven otherwise by clear and convincing medical
evidence.108 Presently, an injured employee may recover a PPI award if
he has reached "maximum medical improvement" and has established a
whole body impairment level of at least 1%, under the AMA guide-
lines.109  If an injured employee has failed to reach an impairment
rating under the guidelines, the employee may recover a PPI award if the
employee has established clear and convincing medical evidence of an
impairment rating, such as a doctor's report, recognizing the subjective-
ness of the employee's pain.l10
The 1995 enactments remove the eligibility of an injured employee
to provide clear and convincing medical evidence, other than evidence of
an impairment rating under the AMA guidelines, in order to establish an
impairment rating."'l Furthermore, the enactments forbid an injured
employee recovering a PPI award based solely on the presence of
pain."l 2 If these enactments pass into law, it will create an impossible
obstacle for injured employees to recover PPI awards who have function-
al impairments not based upon the AMA guidelines. Many injured
workers feel pain that is not demonstrably identifiable under the AMA
guidelines and even the North Dakota Supreme Court has recognized
this phenomena on occasion. 113 Understandably, the Legislature needed
to avoid situations where PPI awards were given to injured employees
who suffered no actual functional impairment, but deceived their doctors
into believing that they were impaired due to their pain. The Legislature
has engaged in line drawing. Those injured employees who can estab-
lish the threshold impairment rating under the AMA guidelines are able
to obtain benefits. Those who may truly suffer impairment, but are not
able to establish their pain under the AMA guidelines, are not allowed to
obtain benefits. In attempting to weed out fraudulent claims, the Legis-
lature has erected a wall which may prevent truly injured employees
from securing PPI awards.
This strong evidentiary barrier is not needed. The Legislature has
overlooked the adequate protection given under the present law. The
108. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-25(4) (1995).
109. See id. (stating that an employee is only entitled to an award for permanent impairment only
after the employee reaches maximum medical improvement).
110. See Kroeplin v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 807, 810 (N.D.
1987) (stating that an objectively demonstrable impairment is not the requirement for recovery under
the statute).
11!. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-25(4) (1995).
112. N.D. CENT CODE § 65-05-12.2(13) (1995).
113. See Kroeplin, 415 N.W.2d at 810 (discussing recovery of benefits even though lacking
medically objectiveable evidence).
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requirement that a claimant establish by "clear and convincing medical
evidence" the existence of a functional impairment separate from the
AMA guidelines provides sufficient protection from fraudulent claim-
ants.'1 4 A claimant unable to establish an impairment rating under the
AMA guidelines first must prove to a doctor, who is trained and em-
ployed by the system, that he suffers an impairment based solely on his
pain."l 5 Additionally, this pain must provide "clear and convincing
medical evidence", the highest standard in civil law, that a functional
impairment exists.116 There was no testimony provided to the Legisla-
ture about the number of claimants that were unable to establish an
impairment under the guidelines, and nevertheless were paid by the
Bureau. Perhaps the incidents of fraudulent claims based solely upon
the employees experience of pain are not all that frequent. What the
Legislature has created is an evidentiary hurdle which hinders an injured
employee from obtaining another aspect of this "sure and certain
relief." The Legislature not only affected the evidentiary standard
required to establish an impairment rating, but also the threshold impair-
ment rating required before awarding a PPI benefit.
The 1995 enactments require an impairment rating of 16% before a
PPI award is granted."l 7 The present law grants a permanent partial
impairment award for impairments as low as 1%.'18 The enactment
seeks only to compensate impairments due to work-related events as
opposed to impairments due to non-work-related events such as aging
and leisure activities."l 9 The Workers' Compensation Fund was created
to benefit an employee injured while in the course of his employment.120
Consequently, an injured employee should only be compensated for the
injury suffered while in the course of his employment. Testimony
behind Senate Bill 2202 claimed that the 1% impairment threshold is not
able to distinguish between work-related and non-work related injuries
and consequently impairment from non-work related injuries were being
compensated.121 The testimony presented alleged that at the 20%
threshold level there was the greatest amount of awards and the greatest
likelihood that the impairment was due to a work-related injury.122
114. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-25(4) (1995).
115. Id. § 92-01-02-25(9).
116. Id. § 92-01-02-25(4).
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(15) (1995).
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12 (repealed 1995). See 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 624, § 2.
119. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-05-12.2(4) (1995).
120. Id. § 65-01-01.
121. Testimony Before the Senate Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on S.B. No. 2202 (Jan. 31.
1995) (written statement of Greg Schmalz, Resources Manager, Melroe Co.).
122. 1995 House Standing Comm. Minutes, Bill/Resolution S.B. No. 2202 (Mar. 9. 1995). The
Bureau originally desired the threshold impairment rating to be set at 20%. Id. "
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The Legislature has attempted to accomplish the impossible. It has
attempted to sever an injured employee into divisible sections. The
enactment has drawn an arbitrary line at 16% which is to establish that
any impairment is work-related over 16%123 and anything below 16% is
due only from a natural occurrence. This is simply impossible. Even
tort law recognizes that you take your victims as you find them. An
individual person is simply too complex to be divided so simply into
work-related and non-work-related elements.
Although the enactments result in a $3,600,000 savings to the
Workers' Compensation Fund and a reduction in employers' premiums
of 3%, approximately 90% of all injured employees with functional
impairments will be denied a PPI award. 124 But because some have lost,
others will gain. The 1995 enactments increase the awards furnished to
employees having impairment ratings above 51%.125 It has also doubled
the cash benefits awarded to those who suffer impairment awards of 90%
or greater.126 Yet, the benefit received through this enactment is an
apparition. Less than 1% of injured employees have a functional
impairment rating of 51% or over. 127 In trying to award only work-
related injuries, the Legislature was attempting to protect only those
employees injured while in the course of their employment. But in
failing to rely on medical evidence, the Legislature has set up an arbi-
trary line withholding "sure and certain relief' from the very employ-
ees it was attempting to help.
The Initiative Petition modifies chapter 624 by requiring the use of
the AMA's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" of
July 1, 1993 which has now been superseded.1 28 Clearly, the drafters of
the Initiated Petition have overlooked the most recent edition of the
AMA's "Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment." The
most recent edition of the "Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment" should be utilized for the most accurate impairment rating
for the injured employee.
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(15) (1995).
124. Testimony Before the Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on S.B. No. 2202 (Jan. 31, 1995)
(statistics regarding PPI awards in fiscal year 1994, presented by Stephen D. Little).
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(15) (1995). Those who have an impairment rating of 51%
or greater are those who compromise 0.6% of the PPI cases dealt with by the Bureau. Testimony
Before the Indus.. Business, & Labor Comm. on S.B. No. 2202 (Jan. 31, 1995) (statistics regarding PPI
awards in fiscal year 1994, presented by Stephen D. Little).
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2(15).
127. Testimony Before the Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on S.B. No. 2202 (Jan. 31. 1995)
(statistics regarding PPI awards in fiscal year 1994, presented by Stephen D. Little).
128. INITIATED PETITION, supra note 2, § 15. See also NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BUREAU NOTES ON INITIATED MEASURE WORKERS' COMPENSATION TITLE 65 (NDCC) (analyzing the
initiated measure's impact on the 1995 enactments).
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Furthermore, the Petition retains the minimum threshold impair-
ment rating of 1% before a PPI award is granted.129 This 1% rating
simply recognizes the inability of the law to sever an injured worker into
work-related or non-work-related parts. Workers agree that only work-
related injuries should be covered by the Workers' Compensation Fund.
But until medical evidence can establish that an injured employee's
impairment is due solely to work-related events, the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act must provide protection to all employees with any impairment
due to work-related events.
Additionally, the Initiative Petition retains the eligibility of the
employee to prove an impairment rating by clear and convincing
medical evidence.1 30  This maintains the protection given to injured
employees who are unable to establish the minimum threshold require-
ment. Furthermore, it provides the clear and convincing standard to
protect the Bureau from paying fraudulent claims.131 It is true that there
are some injured employees who may have enough skill to finesse their
subjective complaints of pain past a doctor in order to recover a PPI
award, but until the Bureau can document how many of these there are,
the Initiated Petition properly protects the injured employees who are
not falsifying claims and who are not able to establish an impairment
rating under the AMA guidelines. The Initiative Petition provides
protection for the injured employee and provides them with a step in the
direction of being able to secure "sure and certain relief."
D. ATTORNEY'S FEES
The 1995 Legislature also altered when attorneys are entitled to
payment of fees and the amount of fees that they may collect under the
Workers' Compensation Act.132 An attorney representing an injured
worker in a binding dispute resolution or an administrative hearing may
only recover his fees from the Bureau when the injured worker has
prevailed.133 Furthermore, enactments to section 65-02-08 establish a
20% cap on any award received except those on the initial issue of
compensability.134 The 20% cap is subject to the maximum fee set out
129. INITIATED PETITION, supra note 2, § 15.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (1995).
133. Id. See also id. § 65-02-15 (providing that the Bureau shall only pay injured employees'
attorneys only when the employee prevails). "Prevailing" includes the settlement of claims. Interview
with Regan Pufall and David Thiele, North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau (Mar. 1995).




in section 92-01-02-11.1 of the North Dakota Administrative Code.135
The enactments also preclude payment of attorneys' fees to those
attorneys whose injured client has not attempted to resolve the dispute
through the Workers' Advisory Program.' 36
Prior to 1995, attorneys received payment of fees whether they
prevailed or not. Furthermore, attorneys were able to recover fees from
the time of constructive denial137 until issuance of a notice of informal
decision from the Bureau.138 The 1995 enactments deny payment to
attorneys whose clients' claim falls into constructive denial.
The intention behind the modifications by the Legislature stemmed
from the concern over the litigiousness in the system and costs associated
with litigating disputed claims. In 1994, the Workers' Compensation
Bureau paid approximately one million dollars to claimants' attor-
135. Id. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1(3) (1995) provides:
Total fees paid by the bureau for all legal services in connection with a claim may not
exceed the following:
b. At a rate of eighty-five dollars per hour the sum of seven hundred dollars, plus
reasonable costs incurred, for legal services in connection with an offer by the bureau to
make a lump sum settlement pursuant to subsection I of North Dakota Century Code
section 65-05-25.
c. The total sum of one thousand eight hundred dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred,
following issuance of an administrative order under North Dakota Century Code chapter
28-32 reducing or denying benefits, for services provided if the formal hearing request is
resolved by settlement before the evidentiary hearing is held.
d. The total sum of three thousand six hundred dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, if
the employee prevails after an evidentiary hearing is held.
e. The total sum of four thousand dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, if the
employee's district court appeal is settled prior to submission of briefs. The total sum of
five thousand five hundred dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, if the employee
prevails after hearing by the district court.
f. The total sum of six thousand five hundred dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, if
the employee's North Dakota supreme court appeal is settled prior to hearing. The total
sum of seven thousand two hundred dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, if the
employee prevails after hearing by the supreme court.
h. The total sum of six hundred dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, for services in
connection with binding arbitration, if the employee prevails, provided further that the
fees may not exceed twenty percent of the amount awarded.
i. The total sum of one thousand dollars, plus reasonable costs incurred, if the employee
requests binding dispute resolution and prevails. The total sum of five hundred dollars
plus reasonable costs incurred, if the employer requests binding dispute resolution and
the employee prevails.
136. N.D. CENT CODE § 65-02-27 (1995). See also infra part III.H. (discussing the Workers'
Advisory Program).
137. See 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 614, § I (indicating the changes to the payment of attorney's fees).
Constructive denial occurs sixty days after everything necessary for the Bureau to issue a formal or
informal decision has been submitted, but due to reasons beyond their control, such as backlog of
cases, the Bureau is unable to issue its decision, and the claim fails into constructive denial. It does not
mean that a claim has necessarily been denied.
138. Id.
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neys.139 Furthermore, the Bureau presented evidence that attorney
involvement is associated with high total claim costs and with no added
benefit to injured employees.140 Proponents of the new enactments
contend that prior to 1995, attorneys had no incentive to bring only
meritorious cases since they received payment for their fees whether they
prevailed or not. 141 Proponents contend that frivolous suits over small
amounts clog up the system preventing quick resolution of claims of
truly injured employees. But perhaps the reason that so many frivolous
claims are being brought by attorneys is the atmosphere which is created
by a bureaucratic system which forces employees to hire an attorney and
incur such expenses.142 Although the Legislature may have been acting
with the best interests of the employee in mind, they have impacted the
opportunity of an injured employee to obtain "sure and certain relief."
The cap and limitations on the payment of fees will provide limitations
on the ability of an injured worker to find counsel. The result will likely
be that injured employees are denied "sure and certain relief' due to
lack of representation.
Moreover, opponents to the denial of attorney's fees for claims that
have fallen into constructive denial allege that it deters the Bureau from
swiftly deciding cases and presents difficulties for injured workers to
secure legal representation.143 The cap and limitations on attorney's fees,
especially in the context of constructive denial, will most likely have no
effect on the Bureau's responsibility to issue decisions. In many con-
structive denial cases, backlog is created by forces beyond the Bureau's
control, such as doctors failing to submit reports, which will not be
affected by attorneys seeking to acquire an injured employees decision.
Interestingly, the Initiative Petition retains the 1995 enactment
which provides attorney's fees to those who prevail. 144 However, the
Initiative Petition repeals the maximum fee arrangements 145 and the 20%
cap on attorney's fees. 146 Even those who oppose the 1995 enactments
realize that the filing of frivolous claims creates obstacles to an injured
139. Testimony before the Senate Indus., Business & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1208 (written
statement of Chuck Peterson. Chair Workers' Compensation Coalition, Greater North Dakota
Association).
140. CLAIM COSTS: AN INTERSTATE COMPARISON, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INS., INC. 3
(Apr. 1994).
141. Interview with Regan Pufall and David Thiele, North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Bureau (March 25, 1996).
142. See Testimony Before the Senate Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1208 (1995)
(written statement of Sandi Tabor, Executive Director, State Bar Association of North Dakota).
143. Testimony Before the Senate Indus., Business & Labor Comm. on H.A. 1208 2-3 (1995)
(written statement of Edwin W.F. Dyer III, Esq.).
144. INITIATIVE PETrrION, supra note 2, § 25.
145. Id.
146. Id. at §§ 4.28.
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employee's ability to obtain "sure and certain relief." But any protec-
tion granted by the above limitation becomes moot by the repealing of
the maximum fee arrangement and the 20% cap on attorney's fees. By
repealing these sections the Initiative Petition will maintain the litigious-
ness of the system, continuing the backlog in the system that the Initia-
tive Petition seeks to avoid. Perhaps increasing the cap on attorney's
fees above 20% will provide a happy medium to both the proponents
and opponents of the legislation. An increase will still provide a cap on
attorney's fees, thereby protecting the Bureau, and it will at the same
time provide a greater incentive to attorneys to take on worker compen-
sation claims.
E. PREFERRED PROVIDER LEGISLATION
In 1995, the legislature enacted the "preferred provider" legisla-
tion. 147 Section 65-05-28.1 allows an employer in an approved risk
management program148 to select the treating doctor for their injured
employees.1 49 An employer who participates in the preferred provider
program must provide written notice to its employees of its selection in
order to inform its employees of the preferred provider.1 50 If the
employee disagrees with the selection of the preferred provider, he is
able to select his own preferred provider as long as he makes the election
and notifies the employer in writing prior to the occurrence of an
injury. 151 According to the legislation, an employee has sixty days after
a compensable injury to seek medical treatment only from the employ-
er's selected preferred provider.152 If the employee seeks treatment
from someone other then the preferred provider, the treatment is consid-
ered noncompensable and the employee becomes responsible for the
medical bills.153 If the employee finds a conflict with the employer's
147. N.D. CENT CODE § 65-05-28.2 (1995). Section 6505-28.1 provides:
Notwithstanding section 65-05-28, an employer subject to this title who maintains an
approved risk management program pursuant to section 65-04-19.1 may select a
preferred provider to render medical treatment to employees who sustain compensable
injuries. "Preferred provider" means a designated provider or group of providers of
medical services, including consultations or referral by the provider or providers.
Id. § 65-05-28.1.
148. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-19.1 (1995) (providing an employer who maintains a safety
program approved by the Bureau a five percent discount on their annual premiums).
149. Id. § 65-05-28.1.
150. Id. § 65-05.28.2.
151. Id. § 65-05-28.2(2).
152. Id. § 65-05-28.2(1).
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28.2(1) (1995). The statute makes an exception for emergency
care and those injuries the "employee reasonably did not know was related to a compensable injury."
Id.
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preferred provider, the employee may make a written request to the
Bureau to change providers.154 But treatment by the employee's chosen
provider is not compensable until approval is given by the Bureau. 55
An employer may object to the employee's choice of provider, but must
file a detailed objection with the Bureau within five days of the employ-
ee's request. 156
By enacting this law, North Dakota has joined the majority of states
that have preferred provider legislation.1 57  Those that support the
enactment believe that employers as premium payers should have the
right to control the choice of doctor.158 Benefits of the Preferred
Provider Program include both the decrease in the costs of claims and
the increase in the quality of medical treatment. 159 Employers have a
strong incentive to ensure that their employees are receiving quality care
which promotes their early and safe return to work. 160 The new enact-
ment intends to provide an injured worker with a doctor who has a
thorough understanding of the nature of their employment situation.
Ideally the doctor of choice would have routinely dealt with workers'
compensation injuries.161 Supporters claim that a preferred provider
who has a working knowledge of the workplace and employment
situation is better able to assist the employer and employee in determin-
ing what types of work the employee can perform and the time frame in
which an injured employee can return to work. 162
Opponents to the enactments fear that employers will favor doctors
that give result-orientated diagnoses unfavorable to the employee. It is
feared that these doctors would be unsympathetic to the injured employ-
ee returning them to work too soon and severing any benefits to which
the employee may be entitled. The enactments require that the employ-
er post their preferred provider list, thereby giving notice to every
employee. However, the law does not require an employee to use the
provider chosen by their employer. The employee may select the doctor
of his choice as long as he notifies his employer before an injury occurs.
Therefore, if an injured worker thinks that the doctor chosen is unsym-
154. Id. § 65-05-28.2(3). The request musi be made more than sixty days following the injury
and at least thirty days prior to treatment by the provider. Id.
155. Id. § 65-05-28.2(4).
156. Id. An employee has five days in which to respond to the employer's objection. Id. The
Bureau must rule within 15 days after the employee's objection or expiration of the time of filing. Id.
157. Testimony Before the Senate Indus., Business, & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1221 (Jan. 23. 1995)
(statement of J. Patrick Traynor, Deputy Director. N.D. Workers' Compensation Bureau).
158. Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3.
161. Testimony Before the Senate Indus., Business & Labor Comm. on H.B. 1221 (Feb. 28, 1995)




pathetic to workers' compensation patients, the worker may exercise the
right to choose the doctor of his choice. Whether an injured employee is
truly free to choose his own doctor may be an enigma, since the injured
employee must first be given approval from the Bureau to visit with the
doctor of their choice. Many workers may fear that the Bureau would
deny them approval to see a physician known to be sympathetic to
workers' compensation patients. The workers would not be protected
from this situation since the Bureau has no obligation to provide any
written documentation of reasons why they are being denied their choice
of doctors.
Furthermore, opponents to the legislation allege that an employee
who disagreed with the preferred provider's diagnosis is unable to
submit evidence of a second opinion. Section 65-05-28.2 prevents a
doctor who is not a preferred provider from rendering an opinion about
any matter pertaining to the injury. 163 This includes matters of "causa-
tion, compensability, impairment, or disability." 164 Consequently, this
would leave the injured worker at the mercy of the employer's doctor
unless an independent medical evaluation is ordered by the bureau.165
The Initiative Petition does not address the preferred provider
enactments. The preferred provider enactments seem to fall under the
Bureau's definition of "sure and certain relief' by promoting quality
care and the early and safe return to work. But in effect the law has
some serious procedural and evidentiary consequences. Ideally, the
preferred provider statute benefits the employee. Perhaps the drafters of
the Initiative Petition should address the shortcomings of the legislation
so that an employee can be granted quality care and a safe return to
work with procedural protections such as written explanations of denials
by the Bureau and the availability of second opinions.
F. DEFINITION OF COMPENSABLE INJURY
1. Objective Medical Findings
The 1995 Legislature redefined "compensable injury." The 1995
Legislature requires a work-related injury to be established by medical
evidence supported by objective medical findings.166 Prior to 1995, the
only evidentiary requirement to establish a compensable injury was that
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28.2(1) (1995).
164. Id.
165. See id. § 65-05-28(3) (providing that injured employees must submit to independent
examination in the event of a dispute between the Bureau and injured employees).
166. Id. § 65-01-02(9).
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an injury had occurred and had arisen out of and in the course of
employment. 67 Therefore, the 1995 enactment requires a higher
standard of proof before an injury is classified as compensable. The
purpose behind the enactment is to weed out those claimants that do not
suffer from a legitimate injury.168 Specifically, this legislation is directed
at those injuries which are commonly based upon the subjective com-
plaints of the injured workers, such as loss of range of motion, atrophy,
loss of muscle strength, and muscle spasm.169
In redefining a compensable injury to require objective medical
findings, the Legislature has placed an obstacle in the way of injured
employees seeking "sure and certain relief." Understandably, false
claims need to be weeded out so that only the truly work-related injured
may receive benefits. But in attempting to accomplish this, the Legisla-
ture made some serious mistakes. What constitutes an objective medical
finding? Under section 65-05-12.2, an impairment rating would quali-
fy,70 but does a doctor's diagnosis of pain overcome the hurdle? By
failing to define "objective medical findings," the Legislature has
created fertile ground for litigation.
Additionally, the enactments eliminate legitimate claims based
solely on subjective complaints not able to be objectively verified, for
example, soft tissue injuries.171 Many injuries have been substantiated,
yet have failed to be supported by objective medical evidence of physi-
cal injury.172 In passing this enactment, the Legislature failed to rely on
any statistics demonstrating the number of claims paid out or denied by
the Bureau because they were based solely on subjective claims of the
injured worker. Furthermore, the Bureau testified that requiring objec-
tive medical evidence would have no material impact on the Workers'
Compensation Fund.173 This, however, seems odd as it would suggest
167. 1995 N.D. Laws ch. 607, § 1.
168. 1995 Senate Standing Comm. Minutes, Bill/Resolution H.B. No. 1225 (Feb. 27, 1995)
(statement of Ken Homer, Cross Country Courier).
169. Testimony to the House Indus., Business & Labor Comm. on H.B. No. 1225 (Jan. 23. 1995)
(written statement of Julie Leer, Attorney N.D. Workers' Compensation Bureau). This enactment
attempts to keep the evidentiary requirements consistent. The 1995 Legislature also modified the
evidentiary requirements for PPI awards. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
170. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-12.2 (1995) (providing the mandatory terms of determining a
permanent impairment).
171. Testimony Before the Senate Indus., Business & Labor Comm. on H.B. No. 1225 (Feb. 27,
1995) (statement of Edwin W.F Dyer III, Esq.).
172. See Johnson v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 496 N.W.2d 562, 565 (N.D. 1993)
(reversing suspension of rehabilitative benefits based on claimants lack of good faith); Kroeplin v.
North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 807. 810 (N.D. 1987) (authorizing PPI award
even though no objectively demonstrable evidence): Lyson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp.
Bureau. 129 N.W.2d 351, 354-55 (N.D. 1964) (upholding finding that claimant was totally and
permanently disabled even though no concrete physical defects were apparent).
173. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU 1995 LEGISLATION, SUMMARY OF ACTUARIAL
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that they are at the present not paying out any unnecessary claims based
solely upon the subjective claims of an injured worker.
The Initiative Petition repeals the definition of compensable injury
which requires evidence of objective medical findings.174 The Initiative
Petition requires proof that the injury arises out of and in the course of
employment.175 In repealing the newer definition, the drafters have torn
down any procedural barrier that was placed in the way of injured
employees who suffered work-related injuries and who could establish
any objective medical evidence. At the same time, the drafters have also
made it easier for impostors to cross the threshold of compensability
since no objective medical evidence will be required to support their
injury. What needs to be to established, and is not accomplished by the
Initiative Petition, is a compromise between those who are legitimately
injured in the course of employment and are unable to establish objec-
tive medical evidence to be compensated from those who are not legiti-
mately injured, and not to be compensated. Perhaps the best way to
resolve this dilemma is to define "objective medical findings" deferen-
tially to include those that suffer subjective findings of pain by eliminat-
ing the objective requirement and including a protective device such as
proof by clear and convincing evidence of medical findings of pain.
This would provide some protection to the Bureau to prevent paying
non-legitimate claims yet provide some protection to legitimately injured
employees by allowing recovery despite a failure to establish "objective
medical findings."
2. Mental-Mental Injuries
Excluded from the 1995 definition of "compensable injury" are
mental injuries caused by mental stimulus.176 An example of a mental
stimulus would be purely mental stress in the workplace.1 77 Prior to
1995, noncompensable mental injuries were those that stemmed from
personnel actions such as transfers, promotions, demotions, or termina-
INFORMATION, H.B. 1225 (Nov. 28, 1994).
174. INITIATIVE PETION, supra note 2, § 2(9).
175. Id.
176. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9)(b) (1995). The new statutory definition of "compensable
injury" does not include "[a] mental injury arising from mental stimulus or a mental or emotional injury
arising principally out of a bona fide personnel action, including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or
termination except an action that is the intentional infliction of emotional harm." Id. These disorders
are dubbed "mental-mental" injuries. Thomas S. Cook. Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims:
Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879. 906-07 (1986-87).
177. 1995 House Standing Comm. Minutes, BilllResolution H.B. No. 1252 (Jan. 23, 1995)
(statement of Robert W. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, N.D. Workers' Compensation Bureau).
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tions.178 Prior to 1995 and presently, physical injuries or disabilities that
result from mental conditions caused by work-related injuries are
compensable.179 Mental disabilities produced from physical trauma are
also compensable.180 The 1995 Legislature enacted this legislation to
address those situations where mental injuries were caused by purely
mental stimuli, for example, depression resulting from stressful condi-
tions at work.181 The Legislature enacted this legislation with the realiza-
tion of the difficulty in presenting a causal relationship between
on-the-job stress and mental disorders for compensation claims. 182
Mental-mental claims are based upon the subjective views of the claim-
ants and are regarded as highly speculative due to the supervening
factors of non-work activities that may be at play.183
The Initiative Petition did not address this part of the enactment
which suggests that both supporters and opponents of the 1995 enact-
ments agree that mental injuries caused by mental stimulus should not be
compensated. There are those who voice concern that the failure to
compensate mental-mental disorders discriminates against those who
suffer a mental injury for which the workplace is the cause. But any
discriminatory effect that the enactment may have is outweighed by the
protection afforded, assuring only proven work-related injuries are
compensated.
G. LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
Perhaps the greatest travesty of the 1995 amendments was to deny
the injured employee liberal construction under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. Section 65-01-01 provides that "[tihis title may not be
construed liberally on behalf of any party to the action or claim."184
Prior to 1995, North Dakota case law interpreted the Workers' Compen-
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9)(b)(9)(5) (1995). The statute did retain intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims for intentional terminations. See also Choukalos v. North Dakota
Workers' Comp. Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 346 (N.D. 1988) (determining mental injury from
termination of employment was not a compensable injury).
179. See Darnell v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 450 N.W.2d 721, 725 (N.D. 1990)
(discussing sufficiency at employment activities as a substantial contributing factor). This group of
mental disorders includes all heart diseases as long as they are employment related and precipitated by
unusual stress. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9)(a)(3). See also supra notes 171-75 and accompanying
text (discussing compensability of claims with nonobjective medical findings).
180. The Workers' Compensation Bureau estimates that over 50% of their claims deal with
psychological trauma produced because of the physical injury.
181. See supra note 176 (addressing claims based on a purely mental stimulus).
182. See Cook, supra note 176, at 902.
183. 1995 House Standing Comm. Minutes, Bill/Resolution H.B. No. 1252 (Jan. 23, 1995)
(statement of Robert W. Morris, Assistant Attorney General, N.D. Workers' Compensation Bureau).
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (1995).
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sation Act liberally in favor of the employee.185 The rationale originated
in Bordson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,186 where
Justice Christianson reasoned that insurance contracts were interpreted to
avoid forfeiture and to afford indemnity. 187  He saw the primary object
of an insurance policy and the Workmens' Compensation Act as the
same, therefore granting the Workmens' Compensation Act the same
construction as an insurance policy. 188 Hence, outgrew the liberal
interpretation construction to promote "sure and certain relief' to those
that may be fairly brought under the Act. Although the case law has
given liberal interpretation to the Act, the North Dakota Supreme Court
requires that the intention behind the section being interpreted be
considered.189
The intention behind this enactment was to provide a "level playing
field" for both the worker, the employer and the Bureau by seeing that
Workers' Compensation cases are decided based strictly on the facts of
each case. 190 North Dakota has joined the minority of states that con-
strue the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act based solely on
the merits of each case. 191 Testimony behind the legislation suggested
that the doctrine of liberal construction caused the Bureau to pay claims
and settle invalid cases because the law was strained to bring those not
185. See Kallhoff v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau. 484 N.W.2d 510, 513 (N.D. 1992);
Effertz v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 481 N.W.2d 218, 221 (N.D. 1992); Souris River
Tel. v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 471 N.W.2d 465.469 (N.D. 1991); Holmgren v. North
Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200, 202 (N.D. 1990); Lawson'v. North Dakota
Workers' Comp. Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 344, 347 (N.D. 1987); Syverson v. North Dakota Workers'
Comp. Bureau, 406 N.W.2d 688, 690 (N.D. 1987); Claim of Bromley, 304 N.W.2d 412, 415 (N.D.
1981); Morel v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 584, 588 (N.D. 1975); Boettner v. Twin City Constr. Co., 214
N.W.2d 635, 639 (N.D. 1974); Heddon v. North Dakota Workers' Comp. Bureau, 189 N.W.2d 634.
638 (N.D. 1971); Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp'. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292, 294-95
(N.D. 1963); Bordson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 191 N.W. 839, 841-42 (N.D.
1923).
186. 191 N.W. 839 (N.D. 1922).
187. Bordson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 191 N.W. 839, 842 (N.D.
1923).
188. Id.
189. See Effertz, 481 N.W.2d at 221.
190. 1995 House Standing Committee Minutes, Bill/Resolution H.B. No. 1217 (Jan. 16, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Carlson).
191. Several states that have legislatively acted to strictly interpret their workers' compensation
acts or have repealed their liberal interpretation statute. See ARK. CODE ANN. § I I-9-704(c)(3)
(Michie 1995); FLA STAT. ANN. § 440.015 (West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 515A.1 (West 1995); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39-A, § 153(3) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.001 (West 1995); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-104 (1995) (repealed); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 616.012 (Michie 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 52-5-1 (Michie 1995). Other states interpret their workers' compensation acts liberally.
See CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 3202 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-23 (Harrison 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 215, para. 5 (Smith-Hurd 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44- 501 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
446.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-155 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.800
(Vernon 1995); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4123.95 (Baldwin 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-37-4 (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-116 (1995); W. VA. CODE § 8-33-12 (1995).
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really deserving of compensation under the Act. The Bureau hopes this
will emphasize to courts interpreting the Act that only work-related
injuries should be compensated.1 92 Therefore, it does not allow courts
leeway in interpreting the provisions of the Act to provide relief. How-
ever in passing the Act, the Legislature has failed to notice that many of
its terms were not defined and consequently will be left to the courts to
interpret. In interpreting those undefined terms, courts must look to the
intentions and purposes behind the statute. The Workers' Compensation
Act is remedial in nature and that purpose should be furthered in inter-
pretation of the Act.
The Initiative Petition repeals the 1995 enactment and requires the
Act to be liberally construed in favor of those that can be brought within
it, based on North Dakota case law.1 93 In so doing, the drafters have
recognized that injured employees are not afforded adequate relief
under the Workers' Compensation Act and have tried to provide what
little help they could for an injured employee trying to obtain his "sure.
and certain relief."
Although the Legislature has interfered with an injured employee
obtaining "sure and certain relief," in the majority of the sections, they
did pass some legislation that does help an injured worker obtain relief.
The noticeable provisions are: the Workers' Advisory program, notifica-
tion provisions, hearing officer requirements, and the uninsured employ-
er compensation provision. The Bureau has also implemented numerous
procedural initiatives such as a toll-free number, customer service unit, a
fraud unit, an imaging system that connects paper files to computer
imaged documents allowing instant and simultaneous access to files,
enhancement of research, and statistics computer technology to monitor
progress of the claims. These developments will provide greater assis-
tance to injured workers in their quest for "sure and certain relief."
H. WORKERS' ADVISORY PROGRAM
The greatest step that the 1995 Legislature took in providing an
injured employee "sure and certain relief' was the adoption of the
Workers' Compensation Bureau's ombudsman's program.1 94 The
Workers' Advisory Program must provide assistance to an injured
employee. The program considers issues concerning decisions of the
192. 1995 House Standing Comm. Minutes, Bill/Resolution H.B. No. 1217 (Jan. 16, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Carlson).
193. INMATIVE PETITION, supra note 2, § I.
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-27 (1995) (including a sunset clause which will remain in effect
until July 31, 1999).
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Bureau, communicates with the Bureau staff, and advises the injured
employee of the effect of the decision on the employee. The informa-
tion uncovered by a Workers' Advisory Program during review of an
injured employee's disputed claim is not subject to discovery and may
not be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings relative to that
dispute.195 The program objective for the Workers' Advisory Program
is to provide a "first stop" opportunity to resolve the injured worker's
problems expeditiously, preclude payment of attorney fees until the
worker's advisers have had an opportunity to interview the aggrieved
party, speed up the litigation process by providing an injured employee
with a copy of the intake document and summary of the facts in dispute,
and provide confidentiality.196 The Bureau testified in support of this
bill claiming that the litigation costs and waiting periods for arbitration
could be substantially reduced with the ombudsman's program.197
Overall it provides a positive alternative to costly litigation processes.
Most parties agree that an ombudsman's program is needed to deal
with injured employees. The Initiative Petition retains the Workers'
Advisory Program but repeals the section disallowing an injured em-
ployee's disputed claim from discovery requests.1 98 The Workers'
Advisory Program allows injured employees quick answers to questions
about their case without the necessity of hiring an attorney. Further-
more, the program provides a bridge between the Workers' Compensa-
tion Bureau and the claimants. Hopefully, the more the claimant is able
to find out about his case, the quest for his "sure and certain relief' will
be easier and faster.
I. NOTICE LEGISLATION
The 1995 Legislature made some strides in providing protection to
an injured employee by adopting the notice provisions.1 99 Section
65-05-01.2 requires an injured employee, injured on the job, to notify
the employer through his immediate supervisor, or one authorized to
receive notice, that the accident occurred. 200 The requirement is lax,
allowing the employee to. give either written or oral notice of the acci-
195. Id.
196. Testimony Before the House Indus., Business & Labor Comm. on S.B. 2377 2-3 (Jan. 31,
1995) (testimony of J. Patrick Traynor).
197. Id.
198. INITIATIVE PETITION, supra note 2, sec. 9.
199. N.D. CTrr. CODE §§ 65-05-01 (providing that an injured employee notify the employer of
the accident); 65-05-01.2 (requiring that notice be given within seven days unless good cause is
shown); 65-05-01.4 (requiring the employer to file a first report of notice of injury with the Bureau
within seven days from the date the employer receives the notice of the injury).
200. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01.2 (1995).
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dent.201 Absent good cause, the notice must be given no later than seven
days after the accident occurred. 202 If an employee fails to notify the
employer of the accident, the Bureau may consider that failure in
notifying in the determination of the injury's compensability. 20 3 Much
stricter standards are placed upon the employer of the injured employee.
If the employer fails to notify the Bureau within seven days of the report
of the injury, this failure to notify is considered an admission by the
employer that the alleged injury may be compensable. 204
Prior to 1995, the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act had
no notification provisions, but relied primarily on the one-year filing
statute. 205 An employee had one year from the date of injury, or from
the time that a reasonable person knew or should have known of the
compensable injury, in which to file a claim.206
The purpose behind this enactment is to ensure that no other
employee is injured and that the Bureau can begin the process to insure
speedy recovery of the injured employee. 20 7 Studies have shown that six
or more days of delay in reporting can more than double the cost of a
claim.208 Furthermore, studies have shown that earlier intervention
decreases the likelihood of litigation. 20 9
Proponents and opponents of the enactment agree that protection of
employees and expediting their claims are of utmost importance. What
the Legislature failed to realize is that they did not clarify certain seg-
ments of the statute. For example, they provided no definition of "good
cause," 210 for the circumvention of the notice requirements. Their
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 65-05-01.3 (providing that failure to notify is only one discretionary factor in the
Bureau's determining the compensability of the injury).
204. Id. § 65-05-1.4.
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (1995). The new statute provides:
[aIll original claims for compensation must be filed by the injured employee, or someone
on the injured employee's behalf, within one year after the injury or within two years
after the death. The date of injury for purposes of this section is the actual date of injury
when that date can be determined with certainty by the claimant and bureau. When the
actual date of injury cannot be determined with certainty, the date of injury is the first
date that a reasonable person knew or should have known that the employee suffered a
compensable injury and the employee was informed by the employee's treating health
care provider that the employee's work activities are a substantial contributing factor in
the development of the employee's injury or condition.
Id.
206. Id.
207. 1995 Senate Standing Comm. Minutes, Bill/Resohtion No. 1206 (Feb. 27, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Skarphol).
208. WORKERS' COMPENSATION COST CONTAINMENT AT THE TRAVELERS, THE TRAVELERS INS. CO.
(Feb. 1994) (supporting Bill/Resolution No. 1206).
209. id.
210. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01.2 (1995).
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failure to do so provides little guidance to claimants. For example, what
if the injured worker suffers from latent syndromes, like carpal tunnel
syndrome? One would assume that a latent condition would be good
cause not to notify one's employer simply because the employee does
not know of the injury until some time later. But are they under a duty
to notify the employer when the injury becomes apparent? The statute
makes it unclear whether latent conditions qualify under the notification
statutes. This provides little guidance for claimants, and anticipates an
injured employee being penalized due to the Legislature's failure to
clarify the statute.
The Initiative Petition repeals the notification enactments. 211 By
repealing the enactments, the drafters have hindered an injured employ-
ee getting a quick resolution of their claim. The notification provisions
will provide speedier access to medical care and benefits and in the long
run "sure and certain relief." They will also help make the workplace
safer by notifying the employer of any injury which occurred due to
unsafe conditions. But the notification provisions need to be amended
in order to clarify what injuries fall under the statute. Employees need
better notice of which injuries need to be reported to employers and the
Bureau.
It should be observed that the notification provisions do not effect
the filing time for an injured employee. A claim may still be filed within
one year after the injury or two years after death.212 If the injury date is
uncertain, the date of injury is the date that a reasonable person knew or
should have known that the employee suffered a compensable injury.2 13
J. HEARING OFFICERS
The 1995 enactments cleaned up a problem with impropriety that
existed within the Workers' Compensation Program and provided also
one of the biggest steps toward an employee obtaining "sure and certain
relief." Section 65-02-22, requires that a hearing officer be law-trained
and maintain an office separate from the Workers' Compensation
Bureau.2 l4 Since 1991, the Bureau has used the Office of Administrative
211. INITIATIVE PETITION, supra note 2, §§ 30-33.
212. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (1995).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 65-02-22. The new statute provides:
A hearing officer designated by the bureau under chapter 28-32 must be a person
licensed to practice law in this state. A hearing officer designated by the bureau may not
maintain an office within the bureau from which the hearing officer conducts daily
business. This section does not preclude a hearing held pursuant to chapter 28-32 from
being held within the bureau.
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Hearings but did not require that their hearing officers be law-trained.
Furthermore, the hearing officers maintained their offices in the Work-
ers' Compensation building. This resulted in an appearance of impro-
priety which caused claimants to have a feeling of insecurity about the
system in which they would have to deal. The Bureau claims that the
costs of implementing this enactment will cost the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund approximately $120,000 per year.215 Whatever this enactment
will actually cost the fund, the Bureau will make up by providing quality
decisions, removing impropriety, and ensuring a fairer system of deci-
sions, moving an employee one step closer to obtaining his or her "sure
and certain relief."
Perhaps the biggest flaw is that the Initiative Petition repeals the
requirement that the hearing officers be law-trained and that hearings be
conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings in accordance with
the Administrative Practices Act. 216 In repealing this section, the drafters
of the Initiative Petition have set back an injured employee's opportuni-
ty of obtaining "sure and certain relief." Having hearing officers
apprised of the law can only result in informed, accurate, and hopefully,
quality decisions. These quality, well-penned decisions, will reduce the
number of decisions appealed which will ultimately let an injured
employee find his or her "sure and certain relief."
IV. CONCLUSION
The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act was intended to
provide immunization to employers and provide employees, their
families, and dependents, "sure and certain relief" regardless of ques-
tions of fault.
The 1995 Legislature's concept of "sure and certain relief' is a
concept which has been influenced by the economic conditions sur-
rounding North Dakota employers and the Workers' Compensation
Bureau. The Legislature has attempted to solve the dilemma of trying to
provide "sure and certain relief" to employees, while trying to keep
premiums down for employers and reduce the alleged $228 million
unfunded liability of the Workers' Compensation Bureau.
With the 1995 Legislative enactments, the Legislature has signifi-
cantly reduced premiums for employers and has reduced the alleged
unfunded liability, but yet arguably has sacrificed an injured workers'
"sure and certain relief' in the process. Of course, the Legislative
215. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BUREAU 1995 LEGISLATION. SUMMARY OF ACTUARIAL
INFORMATION. H.B. 1225 (Nov. 28. 1994).
216. INITATIVE PETITION, supra note 2, § 7.
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changes have been enacted under the guise of providing relief to em-
ployees. Enactments, such as the reduction in the income test and its
mandatory waiver, return the injured worker to the workforce more
quickly than in the past. Enactments requiring objective medical evi-
dence in both rewarding PPI benefits and the definition of compensable
injury apparently provide protection for injured workers by protecting
the Bureau's fund, by making sure only truly injured workers injured by
work-related activities are being compensated. However, these benefits
may be gained at the expense of the worker's financial condition or at
the expense of excluding truly injured workers who are unable to meet
the evidentiary burden. Furthermore, the Legislature has completely
denied benefits to those who reach age sixty-five. Understandably, the
Legislature wants to provide some protection to everyone: the Bureau,
the employer, and the worker. But this is an impossible task. The
Legislature reasons that employees must take cuts so that employers will
remain in the state to provide them jobs. Further, the employees must
take cuts so that the Bureau is able to reduce the $228 million unfunded
liability, so that they may actually pay out the injured employee's
present and future claims. But in taking these cuts, the employee is
rarely given anything in return. This is not to say that the Bureau and
employers do not provide benefits for the injured employee. The 1995
Legislature did create the Workers' Advisory Program, notification
provisions, hearing officer requirements, and uninsured employer
compensation statutes which benefit the injured employee and cost both
the Bureau and employers' money. But the expenditures are dispropor-
tionate.
The Initiative Petition repeals the majority of the 1995 enactments
which include some of the statutes that help the worker obtain "sure and
certain relief." Other sections of the Initiative Petition retain the 1995
enactments with slight modifications. It is between the weakness of the
Initiative Petition and the weakness of the 1995 enactments that injured
employees may find their "sure and certain relief." The Initiative
Petition alone, however, does not provide an injured employee with
"sure and certain relief." In many instances, the Initiative Petition
reverts back to the pre-1995 law, without providing solutions to the
problems that faced the injured worker receiving his or her relief under
the law prior to 1995. It is in the middle ground, between the strengths
and weaknesses of the 1995 enactments, that an injured employee may
find his or her "sure and certain relief."

